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Abstract 
This paper is an empirical analysis of cross-border lending. We examine their evolution from 
1999 to 2018. We divide the years into three phases (1999-2006, 2007-2011, and 2013-
2018) to examine the impact of the global financial crisis on country credit relations. The 
work includes both Western and Eastern countries. After the analysis, we can see how more 
relations between Westerners are taking place. However, these credit relationships were 
reduced due to the 2007 crisis. Another of our findings is that the connection of banking 
institutions can collapse a whole set of countries. This is dangerous because if banks are too 
connected, the systemic risk increases and the imbalance can be transmitted to other 
sectors and areas. When examining the loans that the selected countries make to other 
countries, it highlights that Japan is the main lender. In contrast, the United States is the 
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TITLE: DID THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS LEAD TO THE BREAKDOWN OF CROSS 
BORDER LENDING? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 financial crisis has supposed to make a difference for world economies. 
The first major bankruptcy, by the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, caused a 
collapse of the financial system. It triggered a cascade of bankruptcies that quickly spread 
through the majority of banks and financial institutions. From this moment on, how did 
lending change between the different countries since the financial crisis? This is the main 
issue addressed in this paper. One of the reasons for financial contagion was the strong 
interconnection between institutions. The flagrant imbalance in the United States’ financial 
sector spread to the real economy. The collapse extended to the other advanced economies 
of the world in a short time. The financial crisis also hit the emerging countries. Thus, the 
2007 crisis led to a catastrophic situation that demonstrates without a doubt the fragility of 
the financial system. The goals of this study are to analyze how financial sector connectivity 
can harm an entire economy and how it has affected different countries. 
To answer the question raised, we examined the development of cross-border 
lending. If credit relations between countries increase, the connectivity of their financial 
systems will be greater. In this situation, economies are very sensitive to financial contagion, 
and the systemic risk increases. This can lead to the collapse of an entire economy. 
Therefore, the objective is to analyze how credit relationships between various groups of 
countries have changed. To this end, we have carried out an econometric model estimated 
by random effects in which we examine the evolution of cross-border lending. The work 
includes an overall model estimate covering 20 years (1999-2018) and also a stepwise 
model estimate (1999-2007; 2008-2013; 2014-2018). In this way, we can see how cross-
border lending has changed before, during, and after the global financial crisis. 
The analysis is based on 9 countries, both developed and emerging. Specifically, we 
have separated the countries into two groups. One group consists of Western countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The other 
group is made up of Eastern countries (Japan, Turkey, and Taiwan). The reason for this 
separation is that the 2007 financial crisis began in the United States and Western Europe 
but over time spread to Eastern countries (Dietrich et al. (2011)). It is therefore interesting to 
examine how bank lending changed between the group of Western countries and the group 
of Eastern countries. From the results of the estimation, we get that the western countries 
are the ones that lend the most money to each other during these years.  
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Systemic risk refers to a shock in the financial system that generates enough 
uncertainty to spread to other areas and affect the entire real economy (Nicolo et al. (2002)). 
The banks' interconnection plays a leading role in explaining systemic risk. If banks are 
highly interconnected in the whole economy, one's lack of liquidity can spread to others. This 
is one reason why that triggered the 2007 financial crisis (Jeffers et al. (2013)). Because of 
these developments, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker emphasized the need 
to reduce the size of large financial institutions, limit their interconnections or limit their 
activities. His purpose was to minimize the risk of bankruptcy (2012). At the international 
level, systemic risk and financial contagion are also relevant. Globalization means that the 
financial crisis in a given country can be transmitted to other countries through the financial 
markets. Therefore, a shock to a country's finances implies an imbalance in its economy and 
those of other countries. 
The financial crisis made the difference in the conception of the effects of systemic 
risk. Before the financial crisis, there was a strong belief based on the interdependence 
between banks reduced uncertainty by diversifying risk among several institutions. Besides, 
increased bank connectivity could also be seen as a way to achieve greater global financial 
stability (Battiston et al. (2012)). Bartram et al. (2007) analyzed the effect of different 
financial crises on banks in 28 countries. From this study, they concluded that in developed 
economies there is little evidence that a shock is systemically transmitted throughout the 
economy. In 2007 it was demonstrated that if the financial system is highly connected, 
systemic risk is greater (Battiston et al. (2012)). The years preceding the crisis were 
characterized by the low quality of bank loans and high bank risk. In this context, default 
rates are higher (Bedendo et al. (2012)). An example of this was the collapse of the 
securitization market in 2008. The banks converted their assets into credit derivatives. 
Therefore, they could not sell it when liquidity was needed. As a result, chain failures 
occurred. This becomes clear the strong systemic risk faced by all banks (Nijskens et al. 
(2011)). 
Given the importance of systemic risk, many theoretical models have been 
developed to better understand its functioning. One of the first is the application by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983). It aims to determine the risk aversion of banks. They concluded that self-
fulfilling panic led to a cascade of bank failures and caused damage to the real economy. In 
the model, the Nash equilibrium could emerge in which the distribution of risk was optimal. 
So the economy was functioning properly. On the other hand, agents could panic and 
withdraw their deposits in the first period. If everyone anticipated this, the only optimal 
balance possible was the early withdrawal of deposits. This demonstrates the delicacy of the 
financial system. Using this framework, Freixas et al. (2000) developed another model with 
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several regions. Depositors in one region could decide whether to consume in the region of 
origin. The more risk-averse, given the uncertainty of available consumer resources in the 
new region, could withdraw their deposits early. This generated blockages on solvent banks 
and liquidity problems. Thus, interbank links exposed the system to inefficient outcomes. 
Allen and Gale (2000) developed another important model to explain financial 
contagion. They used the interbank network structure for the first time. This was an 
extension of the previous model. Its objective was to assess whether the increased 
interconnection between banks had advantages because of risk sharing, or disadvantages 
because of increased systemic risk. In the model, they connected four regions or banks and 
they introduced shock into one of them. If this region could not cope with the shock it could 
become insolvent and go bankrupt. To solve this, the bank could turn to other institutions 
and the shock would spread, causing a chain of bankruptcies. Thus, the liquidity imbalance 
between regions increases and the systemic risk appears. Duffy et al. (2018) used this 
model but introduce two types of interbank network structures: complete and incomplete. 
With high settlement rates or complete structure, equilibrium could be maintained. If they are 
low and the structure is incomplete, there were runs on all banks and the whole system was 
collapsing. Yang et al. have empirically demonstrated that the effects of systemic risk are 
more severe than the benefits of bank diversification (2019). 
It is also interesting to review the effect of systemic risk on agent dynamics and the 
economic cycle. Tedeschi et al. (2012) studied it in their model, in which the goods market 
interacted with the credit and interbank market. Specifically, to increase their production, 
companies could ask for money from banks that provide them with lower interest rates. 
When banks had a lack of liquidity they borrow from other banks. If a company could not pay 
its debt, the bank raises the interest rate for the rest and defaults can occur. This led to the 
bankruptcies of borrowers’ banks and lenders’ banks. Thus, the interest rate played a key 
role because defaults depend on it. If it was too high, borrowers became insolvent and could 
not repay their loans. In response, lenders reduced their credit supply and borrowers had to 
increase their rationing. On the other hand, if the interest rate was too low, banks would not 
make a profit (Berardi et al. (2017)).  
When explaining the reasons for a financial crisis, mention must be made of 
deregulation. According to Allen et al. (2000), financial crises have three phases. First, there 
is deregulation or financial release, which leads to an expansion of credit. This causes an 
increase in the price of assets, such as real estate. The second phase is the bursting of the 
bubble. This is the rapid fall in prices caused by a change in the real economy or by the 
failure to meet expectations of interest rates and the level of credit. Finally, there are defaults 
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by agents who are unable to repay their loans. At this time there are banking crises and the 
investment and real activity fall. This is what happened in 2007. Faced with the deregulation 
of previous years, banks transferred credit risk by increasing their connectivity. As a result, 
banks eliminated individual credit risk but systemic risk increased (Nijskens et al. (2011)). 
Thus, there is a need for improved macro-prudential regulation to control systemic risk 
(Huang et al. (2012), Kabundi et al. (2019)). However, deregulation leads to increased 
competition that improves the efficiency of banks (Laeven et al. (2016)). For this reason, 
models have also been developed that include an external regulator to control the 
contribution of banks to a systemic crisis (Acharya et al. (2017)). 
From all the above, it is clear that the interconnections maintained by the banks have 
a great influence on the economies. This paper will examine how loans change between 
different countries, taking into account key factors such as interest rates, the external debt 
accumulated by the countries, and the level of connection they maintain, among others. To 
better understand the role played by the interbank connection in the 2007 financial crisis, 
special attention will be paid to previous and next years. On the other hand, the countries on 
which the study focuses are both industrialized and emerging countries. According to a 
report by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS): 'cross-border bank lending was one of 
the channels through which the crisis spread to emerging markets' (Takáts (2010)).  
According to Tanveer et al. (2013), the crisis had different effects on different areas. It 
deeply affected the industrialized countries, but in the emerging ones the shock was 
temporary and they were able to recover quickly. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to 
the level of development of countries. 
In the following points, we try to resolve the issues raised. It is structured as follows. 
Firstly, section 1 is a descriptive analysis of the data used for the variable explained. 
Specifically, this variable is the loan that countries grant to other countries. This is therefore 
cross-border lending. Secondly, there is the econometric model. This includes the general 




2. DATASET DESCRIPTION 
Inter-country loans are a key feature in assessing the risk of financial contagion at 
the global level. The objective of this study is to have a clearer picture of their evolution over 
the years. Specifically, the countries chosen are Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DNK), Spain 
(ESP), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Japan (JPN), Turkey (TUR), Taiwan (TWN) 
and the United States (USA). These are both advanced and emerging countries. The data 
used can be found in the consolidated banking statistics provided by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). It is of particular interest to examine how lending between 
these countries has evolved during the subprime crisis that led to a global financial crisis. 
Therefore, the range of years from 1999 to 2018 will be taken into account. The original 
frequency of the data is quarterly, although later they have been converted to an annual 
frequency. 
Firstly, a static analysis of the data has been carried out. Table 1 shows the amount 
of money that countries have lent on average during the chosen period. The data are shown 
according to their status as lenders (L) or borrowers (B). This table is used to find out which 
countries have the most credit relationships. The highest amount of loans granted by 
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Turkey, and the United States is directed to the United 
Kingdom. Therefore, the United Kingdom is the main recipient of loans on average. On the 
other hand, the United States is the main recipient of loans from the United Kingdom, Japan, 
and Taiwan. As for borrowers, Denmark, France, Japan, and Taiwan receive loans mainly 
from the United States. Belgium and the United Kingdom receive more loans from France, 
and Spain and Turkey receive more money from the United Kingdom. Finally, the United 
States receives more loans from Japan. 
From the results obtained, it can be concluded that Japan is the lender par 
excellence. It has been the country that has lent the most in total to the others. In contrast, 
Turkey is the lender with the lowest amount of money borrowed. In terms of borrowers, the 
United States is the country that has borrowed the most. Turkey is the borrower that has 
received the least amount on average during the selected period. To improve the descriptive 
analysis, Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of lenders and borrowers. Here 
again, it can be corroborated that the main lender is Japan. 
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Table 2: Statistics describing the position of countries' lenders or borrowers for the entire 
time period of interest 
 BEL DNK ESP FRA GBR JPN TUR TWN USA 
LENDERS 
MEAN 21.126.170 4.891.156 15.759.234 70.217.306 67.007.759 119.797.273 1.158.523 6.051.826 57.438.109 
STD. 24.885.551 6.855.425 17.040.490 72.677.893 97.790.435 226.434.751 1.763.149 10.487.577 63.525.548 
BORROWERS 
MEAN 14.886.013 5.513.246 21.382.343 49.199.244 85.117.920 85.117.920 6.607.995 5.524.824 150.792.313 
STD. 17.302.304 17.302.304 23.590.386 46.603.642 81.936.079 32.862.001 4.980.682 5.873.095 231.279.081 
A dynamic analysis of the data has also been carried out to gain a better 
understanding of the credit relationships between countries. The evolution of countries in 
terms of their status as lenders or borrowers can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. 
Turkey and Taiwan have exchanged the least amount of loans with the other countries. In 
general, Japan is the country that lends the most money during the period analyzed. In 
contrast, the US is the one that receives the most loans in these years. Both amounts have 
been increasing quarter after quarter. This highlights Japan's powerful financing capacity. 
One of the reasons for this is the rapid growth of its economy over the years. As a result, 
Japan has large financial markets. In addition, it is a capital-intensive country (Shirai (2017)). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of loans granted by countries 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of loans received by countries 
Specifically, Belgium lent money until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. 
France also reduced bank lending to other countries with the onset of the crisis but has 
continued to be a lender in subsequent years. Spain and the United Kingdom have been 
borrowing countries until 2017 and 2018 respectively when they started lending money. 
Japan is the largest lender in the period of time studied. However, the USA and Turkey have 
been borrowers throughout these years. Taiwan and Denmark have been alternating lenders 
and borrowers periods. It should be noted that Denmark changed from lending to borrowing 
in 2007 but in 2013 became a lender again. This may be an indication of its rapid recovery 
from the crisis. Cross-border bank lending generally declined with the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. One reason for the reduction in supply is the stress experienced by major 
international banks (Takáts (2010)). The evolution of cross-border lending for each country 








Figure 3: Evolution of loans granted and received by each country 
 
To better assess credit relationships between countries, the Lender's Preference 
Index (LPI) can be used. This is a measure of the proportion of money a country has lent to 
each of its borrowers about its total borrowing (Cocco et al. (2009)). The LPI is calculated for 
each year studied. Table 3 shows 3 years, in particular, 2000, 2008, and 2018. It is a way of 
capturing the credit links that countries maintained before, during, and after the subprime 
crisis. From these results, it can be concluded that 2008 was the year in which there were 
more credit relationships. These figures were considerably reduced following the spread of 
the financial crisis. On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that emerging countries 
are not the main borrowers of any other country. The United Kingdom and the United States 
are the two countries that have the greatest relationships. As far as continental European 
countries are concerned, they are mainly lenders from the United Kingdom. Finally, the data 
shows that all countries have maintained their credit relationships with the same borrowers 
throughout the years studied. 
Equation 1: Lender's Preference Index (LPI) 
 
Table 3: Lender Preference Index to 2000, 2008 and 2018 
 LENDERS 
 BEL DNK ESP 
BORROWERS 2000 2008 2018 2000 2008 2018 2000 2008 2018 
BEL    4.74% 6.32% 3.65% 9.63% 8.85% 2.23% 
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DNK 2.62% 1.67% 0.74%    1.24% 1.59% 0.70% 
ESP 5.81% 10.14% 13.00% 1.13% 9.68% 4.80%    
FRA 25.67% 23.78% 33.91% 6.38% 10.20% 34.21% 19.73% 28.87% 21.60% 
GBR 38.90% 42.62% 32.23% 69.09% 53.31% 31.29% 37.21% 42.96% 28.92% 
JPN 2.14% 0.96% 1.83% -0.12% 0.37% 0.98% 0.83% 0.27% 5.16% 
TUR 0.40% 2.43% 1.84% 0.58% 0.55% 2.22% 1.02% 0.27% 16.02% 
TWN 0.43% 0.06% 0.07% 0.02% 0.05% 0.09% 0.00% 0.03% 0.26% 
USA 25.74% 18.35% 16.38% 17.45% 19.52% 22.76% 25.85% 17.15% 25.13% 
 
 LENDERS 
 FRA GBR JPN 
BORROWERS 2000 2008 2018 2000 2008 2018 2000 2008 2018 
BEL 10.72% 8.17% 9.47% 6.51% 5.56% 1.65% 1.16% 2.56% 1.51% 
DNK 0.98% 1.17% 1.53% 2.46% 1.74% 1.03% 0.67% 1.28% 1.24% 
ESP 8.78% 14.17% 7.80% 4.13% 8.85% 3.30% 1.50% 2.80% 2.05% 
FRA    15.31% 16.77% 17.49% 6.67% 10.20% 11.56% 
GBR 29.91% 44.30% 35.25%    21.27% 19.58% 10.85% 
JPN 11.39% 8.79% 11.31% 10.98% 7.86% 10.04%    
TUR 1.61% 1.06% 2.83% 1.03% 1.54% 2.16% 0.34% 0.39% 0.97% 
TWN 0.85% 0.32% 2.26% 1.37% 0.90% 3.04% 0.61% 0.64% 1.16% 





 TUR TWN USA 
BORROWERS 2000 2008 2018 2000 2008 2018 2000 2008 2018 
BEL 1.45% 6.40% 4.66% 0.85% 1.45% 0.30% 6.38% 5.19% 3.47% 
DNK 0.38% 3.29% 0.15% 1.35% 0.27% 0.24% 3.99% 4.22% 1.42% 
ESP 0.09% 1.30% 0.43% 0.40% 0.23% 0.68% 4.35% 7.29% 6.12% 
FRA 2.89% 7.39% 10.51% 2.75% 5.72% 11.56% 15.32% 17.17% 25.82% 
GBR 48.87% 66.06% 51.67% 13.81% 18.06% 19.64% 44.25% 50.68% 31.28% 
JPN 0.28% 0.20% 2.04% 16.43% 4.30% 13.99% 16.77% 9.97% 24.57% 
TUR    0.51% 0.24% 0.92% 3.28% 3.33% 2.27% 
TWN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%    1.11% 2.16% 5.05% 
USA 46.05% 15.36% 30.53% 63.90% 69.72% 52.68%    
 
The Lender Preference Index shows how credit relationships generally increased 
until the financial crisis. In subsequent years, credit relationships were reduced in most 
cases. This is reminiscent to the Minskyan financial instability hypothesis. It is based on the 
fact that a high debt-income ratio reduces the stability of the financial structure (Minsky 
(1964)). The years preceding the crisis were marked by a major economic expansion that 
prompted agents to take on debt to increase their income. As Minsky argues, the 
disproportionate increase in debt threatens the fragility of the financial sector. As long as the 
debt can be paid off it has a positive effect because it stimulates economic growth. In other 
words, as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio is positive, borrowing will be beneficial. However, if 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is excessively high, it can lead to severe recessions such as the one 




3.1. ECONOMETRIC MODEL SPECITICATION 
The study aims to analyze the evolution of cross-border bank lending. The same 
countries are monitored at different points in time. It is therefore an econometric model 
based on panel data. It includes advanced (Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, and the United States) and emerging economies (Turkey, and Chinese 
Taipei). The countries have been divided into two groups: the area where the crisis began 
(the West) and the area to which it spread (the East) to examine how credit relationships 
between the two groups have changed. The West includes Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the East includes Japan, Turkey, and 
Chinese Taipei. The period chosen is from 1999 to 2018, with a special focus on the period 
of the subprime crisis. The frequency of the data has been converted to annual frequency to 
estimate the model.  
First, the regression has been estimated for the entire range of years using fixed and 
random effects. In this model, it is preferable to use the fixed-effect estimation. However, the 
focus is on random-effects estimation to examine how credit relationships between Western 
and Eastern countries change. Second, the regression has been estimated using random-
effects but distinguishing between three stages: before, during, and after the global financial 
crisis. This estimate aims to examine the impact of the financial crisis on lending from one 
country to another. 
Following the work of Vidal-Tomás et al. (2019), all the variables used are bi-
directional, i.e. the same variable is included for two countries according to their status as 
lender (B) or borrower (L). Because some variables have very high numbers, logarithms will 
be used to facilitate the handling of these variables. Specifically, the amounts borrowed 
between countries, the GDP of each country, and the numbers of reserves held are 
expressed in logarithms. The model also includes dummy variables. Its purpose is to 
understand how credit relations between advanced Western countries and Eastern countries 
have changed. Therefore, the econometric model used is the following:  
Equation 2: Econometric model 
  (          )  
        (      )      (      )                              
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The variable explained (          ), measures the amount of money that countries 
have lent to others. As for the explanatory variables,        and       , indicate the nominal 
GDP in millions of US dollars of the countries according to their status as lenders or 
borrowers respectively.        and        refer to the interest rate on government bonds. 
This variable has been included because it is useful as an indicator of the health of the 
financial market.          and          represent the interbank rate maintained by the 
countries. It measures the level of connectivity between their banks and financial institutions. 
       and        show the reserves in millions of US dollars, except for gold, available to 
countries. The objective of including them is to know the international liquidity of the different 
areas.        and        is the sovereign debt of each government expressed in terms of 
GDP.         ,          indicate the corruption that exists in the countries and       ,  
       show the quality of their regulation. Both estimates vary between -2.5 (weak) and 2.5 
(strong).        and        is the unemployment rate expressed as a percentage of the total 
labour force. 
Furthermore, the model also includes dummy variables:        ,        and 
      . The first        dummy variable shows the loans that countries with Western 
economies make to other countries with Western economies. Secondly,         shows the 
level of cross-border lending between Eastern countries. Thirdly and lastly, the dummy 
variable        shows the level of lending by Eastern countries to Western countries. To 
avoid a problem of perfect collinearity, the dummy variable which measures the loans 
granted by Western economies to Eastern countries is omitted. Finally,      represents the 
fixed effects of the selected countries and is        the term for the disturbance. 
3.2. THE SETUP OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Each country has its individual and unobservable behaviour. These characteristics 
can be taken into account in the model through individual fixed-effect estimation. 
Specifically, the fixed effects of the various countries are represented by the expression 
    . Spain, for example is characterized by a structural unemployment rate. Another 
particularity includes is the distance between countries. Table 4 exposes all results which 
have been obtained by fixed-effects. It is important to corroborate the existence of these 
fixed effects. The F statistic and the p-value are used to prove this existence. Since they 
have values of 60.775 and 3.82539e-104 respectively, it is demonstrated that the countries 
have individual fixed effects. This conclusion is reached through the following contrast: 
 
18 
- Null hypothesis (H0): There is no joint significance of the individual effects. 
- Alternative hypothesis (H1): There is joint significance of the individual effects. 
- F (55, 213.8) = 60.775. 
Another way of estimating the regression treated in the work is through random 
effects (Table 4). This procedure considers that the individual effects are not independent of 
each other. Instead of considering a fixed value of the individual effects that remain constant 
over time ( ), it considers a random variable that revolves around a central value (  ). 
Therefore, it includes that the characteristics of each state are different and also 
contemplates the impact of independent variables. The advantage of using a random-effects 
model is that it allows for the inclusion of variables that are constant over time because it 
ensures that the unobservable effect is not correlated with any independent variable. The 
existence of random effects is confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan test. The value of the Chi-
square statistic (3822.99) is higher than its critical value. Consequently, there is evidence 
that there is an unobservable component of variance associated with each individual. The 
contrast used is as follows: 
- Null hypothesis (H0): Var (  ) = 0. 
- Alternative hypothesis (H1): The null hypothesis is not fulfilled. 
- Chi-square (1) = 3822.99. 
Table 4: Estimation by individual fixed effects and random effects 


























         
0.0139 (**) 
(0.0059) 
0.0104  (*) 
(0.0056) 
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 From the results obtained, it is possible to know the explanatory variables that have 
the greatest effect on the one explained, i.e. on cross-border credit loans. The most relevant 
if the model is estimated by individual fixed effects is the GDP of the lender and the 
borrower, the reserves of the borrowers, corruption and the regulatory quality of the lending 
countries and the unemployment rate of the lender. Its significance level is 99%. Also 
important, at a significance level of 95%, are the rate of return on the borrower's government 
bonds, the interbank rate of the lenders, the regulatory quality, and the unemployment rate 
of the borrowers. The remaining independent variables do not explain the changes in cross-
border credit lending. The coefficient of determination should also be taken into account. 
According to R , the independent variables explain 93.671% of the variation in cross-border 
credit relationships. 
 Most explanatory variables positively affect the explained one. If the GDP of the 
lender and the borrower increase by 1%, cross-border loans increase by 1.018% and 
0.885% respectively. On the other hand, a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of return 
on borrowers' government bonds leads to a 0.689% increase in cross-border loans. The 
interbank rate of lending countries also has a positive effect. The more connectivity, the 
more loans they can make abroad. Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
interbank rate increases cross-border lending by 1.391%. Another variable that has a 
positive influence is regulation. If the quality of regulation of both lenders and borrowers is 
high, security will be greater and more loans will be made across borders. An increase in 1 
unit of regulatory quality for both lender and borrower implies an increase in cross-border 
concessions of 102.714% and 49.604% respectively. Finally, cross-country lending 
increases by 4.742% if the unemployment rate of borrowers increases by 1 percentage 
point. 
 On the other hand, the independent variables that have a negative effect are the 
reserves held by the borrowers, the corruption of the lenders, and the unemployment rate of 
the lending countries. If total reserves held by borrowers increase by 1%, cross-border 
lending decreases by 0.596%. If there is an increase of 1 unit of corruption of the lenders, 
the credits between countries are reduced by 158.632%. Finally, with an increase of 1 
percentage point in the lending countries' unemployment rate, cross-border loans 
experience a decrease of 6.528%. The unemployment rate is an indicator of the economic 
situation of a country. If countries have a high unemployment rate, their economy will not be 
in a good place. Therefore, it is likely that during this time they will lend less to other 
countries. 
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 Secondly, there are the results of the model estimated by random effects. According 
to these results, the independent variables that explain most cross-border lending are the 
lenders' and borrowers' GDP, the interest rate on government bonds and reserves of 
borrowers, and the level of corruption, regulatory quality, and unemployment of lenders. 
These variables are relevant at a level of 99%. On the other hand, borrowers' regulatory 
quality is relevant at a significance level of 95%. Finally, the lenders’ interbank rate and the 
sovereign debt of the lenders and the unemployment rate of the borrowers also explain the 
model at 90%. Thus, most of the variables included in the model are important to explain 
cross-border lending. 
It is important to interpret the model coefficients. The GDP of the lenders and 
borrowers has a positive effect on the dependent variable. If the lender's GDP increases by 
1%, cross-border loans increase by 0.908%. The loans between countries increase by 
0.997% if the borrowers' GDP increases by 1%. The interest rate on borrowers' government 
bonds also has a positive effect. With an increase in 1 percentage unit of this explanatory 
variable, cross-border loans increase by 0.906%. Fourthly, a 1 percentage unit increase in 
the lenders' interbank rate leads to a 1.04% increase in cross-border loans. If the lenders' 
sovereign debt increases by 1 percentage unit, the dependent variable increases by 0.555%. 
Another variable that has a positive effect is the quality of regulation of lenders and 
borrowers. If the lenders' regulatory quality increases by 1 unit, the explained variable 
increases by 103.4%, and if the borrowers' regulatory quality increases by 1 unit, the 
explained variable increases by 51.95%. Finally, an increase in 1 percentage unit in the 
borrowers' unemployment rate increases of 3.65% in loans granted abroad. 
In this case, there are also explanatory variables with a negative effect. One of these 
is the level of reserves held by countries with a borrower position. A 1% increase in this 
explanatory variable implies a 0.535% decrease in the granting of external credit. If a country 
maintains large reserves, it will have less money available for lending. An increase of 1 unit 
in corruption maintained by the governments of the lenders implies a reduction of 127.509% 
in cross-border credits. Finally, the unemployment rate in the lending countries also has a 
negative impact. If this rate increases by 1 percentage point, loans to other countries 
decreased by 6.409%. Again, it has a negative effect because if the unemployment rate is 
high, the country will not be doing well and its lending capacity will be reduced. 
The countries have western or eastern economies during all the years analyzed. 
These characteristics are already included in the estimation of fixed effects through the term 
   . Therefore, dummy variables reflecting this characteristic are only taken into account 
when estimating the model with random effects. These variables are relevant in the model. 
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Specifically, the dummy variable relating to western countries explains cross-border lending 
by 90%. It presents a result of 79.62%. Therefore, western countries have continued to lend 
money to each other during the period analyzed. In contrast, the dummy variable that 
measures the connections between eastern countries shows that loans between them have 
decreased (-298.09%). This variable is important at a level of 99%. Finally, the dummy 
variable referring to loans that eastern countries grant to western countries is important at a 
level of 95%. From its result, it can be concluded that targeted lending from eastern to 
western countries is decreasing (-149.95%). Thus, eastern countries cut off their relations 
with the other eastern countries and also with the western countries. 
Hausman's test is used to evaluate which is the best method to estimate the model. 
The p-value obtained with this contrast is low and the null hypothesis can be rejected. This 
indicates that the random-effects model is less consistent. Thus, Hausman's test indicates 
that the fixed-effects model is the best choice. However, random-effects estimation is useful 
for examining how cross-border credit relationships have evolved between countries 
according to their characteristic of poverty or wealth. This is not a problem because the 
results of both estimates are similar. Specifically, the contrast made is as follows: 
- H0: Random effects. 
- H1: Fixed effects. 
- H = 131.978 with p-value = 2.64927e-020. 
3.3. ECONOMETRIC MODEL BY STAGES OG THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
 This study extends from 1999 to 2018. As mentioned above, three different stages of 
the business cycle can be identified during this time. The years between 1999 and 2006 
were marked by strong growth. During these years the banking systems recorded solid 
balance sheets and large profits (Cabral (2013)). In 2007 the financial system began to 
collapse. As a result, the economic expansion came to an end and the countries entered a 
period of crisis. Two years later, in 2009, economies began to recover. Some studies 
determine that this year is the end of the global financial crisis. However, other analyses 
show that the crisis did not end until 2011 (Do et al. (2018)). Besides, each country 
experienced a different recession and some recovered later. It is therefore not possible to 
determine an exact year as the end of the financial crisis. In this case, the recession years 




 The results obtained when estimating the model by separating the data by stages are 
shown below (Table 5). Firstly, the growth period 1999-2006 is taken into account. Secondly, 
the years of recession marked by the sovereign debt crisis, 2007-2011. Third and last, the 
model is estimated for the years when economies have already recovered, 2012-2018. The 
objective is to assess how cross-border lending has changed following the financial crisis 
that began in 2007. Once again, the focus is on the credit relationships between western and 
eastern countries.  
Table 5: Estimation by random effects for each stage 
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 The model's estimation by random effects for each stage shows that cross-border 
lending and the variables that explain it have changed. Lenders' GDP has become irrelevant 
since the outbreak of the crisis. In contrast, borrowers' GDP has remained relevant in 
explaining cross-border lending. Its effect is positive, i.e. borrowers with higher GDP will 
receive more loans from other countries. Government bond yields were not relevant before 
the financial crisis. In the period of economic recession, this variable became important for 
lenders and borrowers. In the case of lenders, this variable had a negative influence and has 
continued to be relevant. In contrast, in the case of borrowers, this variable had a positive 
effect during the crisis but ceased to be important in the years following the recession. 
 The interbank rate of lenders and borrowers was relevant in the period of strong 
growth before the crisis. This variable was positive on both sides. It is an indication of the 
strong connectivity that the banks maintained. If banks in one nation lend money to each 
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other, they can lend more to other countries. As mentioned above, when the crisis broke out, 
there were many defaults. Thus, relations between banks were broken. This explains why as 
of 2007 the borrowers' interbank rate was no longer relevant. In the case of lenders, this 
variable ceased to be relevant in the last period. On the other hand, lenders' reservations 
became relevant during the crisis. After the recession period, their importance even 
increased. The reason may be that, in a situation where there were many defaults, having 
reserves was positive for the banks. In contrast, borrowers' reserves were only relevant in 
the first period. In this case, their effect was negative, i.e. cross-border lending decreased if 
borrowers' reserves increased. 
 The following three variables are characteristics of the government: sovereign debt, 
level of corruption, and the quality of regulation. As for sovereign debt, it was relevant for 
lenders from 2007 to 2018. It had a positive effect on cross-border lending. The influence of 
corruption changed dramatically. Before the financial crisis, it was not important, but after the 
outbreak of the crisis, it became very relevant. From 1999 to 2007 the presidents and 
directors of the major US banks held political positions. It was a form of corruption because 
they made decisions according to their own interests. The consequence was devastating. 
Therefore, from 2007 onwards, countries took into account the level of corruption of others 
when granting loans. The effect was negative, i.e. cross-border loans decreased if corruption 
increased. The quality of regulation had no effect except on lenders during the last period. 
 The importance of the unemployment rate has also changed over the years. In the 
case of lenders, it is relevant during the period of economic recession. In contrast, the 
unemployment rate of borrowers has been relevant over all these years examined. Its effect 
has been positive except in the years of the financial crisis. During these years all the 
countries included in the model went through times of recession. As a result, unemployment 
rates were high. In a situation like this, it is usual that countries did not have the capacity to 
lend money to other areas. Therefore, from 2007 to 2011, cross-border lending decreased if 
the unemployment rate was high. 
 Again, it is important to focus on the dummy variables to see how the relationships 
between different countries have changed. The results show that the strongest relationships 
are between countries in the same group. Thus, the relevant dummy variables to explain 
cross-border loans are        and       . They are important at a 99% level in all 
three stages. In general terms, western countries have borrowed money because the 
coefficients of their dummy variables are positive in all years (238,264% in the 1999-2006 
stage; 126,073% in the 2007-2011 stage and 148,420% in the stage from 2012-2018). 
These results indicate that the level of loans exchanged between western countries was high 
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during the growth stage. With the outbreak of the crisis this magnitude was reduced. During 
the new growth years after the collapse, the relationship between them has increased again. 
However, it has not been as high as before the crisis.  
 On the other hand, account must also be taken of how credit relationships have 
evolved between eastern countries. The coefficient of the corresponding dummy variable for 
this group of countries is negative (−281% in the 1999-2006 stage, −336% in the 2007-2011 
stage and −289% in the 2012-2018 stage). Therefore, eastern countries are not the main 
destination for loans from other eastern countries. Despite maintaining negative relationships 
in all the years analyzed, some changes can be seen between the stages. Its cross-border 
loans decreased as it moved from the growth stage (first) to the crisis stage (second). After 
the crisis, i.e. in the years when economies had already recovered, credit relations between 





In this paper, we have examined how lending has changed from one country to 
another in recent years (from 1999 to 2018). We have focused on the changes in credit 
relationships between countries before and after the global financial crisis because of the 
impact it had. This has been done using BIS data from the countries' domestic banks. The 
work includes 9 countries. They are separated into a group of Western countries and a 
group of Eastern countries to examine how their credit relationships have changed. The 
methodology used has been estimation by random effects. The work also includes the 
estimation of the model by fixed effects. The results obtained by both methods are similar. 
From the relevant analyzes, we can conclude that Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States (Western countries) exchanged a large number 
of loans. However, the credit relations between Japan, Turkey, and Chinese Taipei (Eastern 
countries) were quite minor. Both groups were affected, sooner or later, by the 2007 crisis. 
This led to a reduction in lending by all the countries in the sample. Western countries 
continued to lend, although to a lesser extent. In contrast, Eastern countries cut off their 
relations with the other Eastern countries and also with Western countries. Thus, the 2007 
collapse decreased cross-border lending. However, Japan has been the lender par 
excellence. It has lent more than the other countries during the period under review. In 
contrast, the United States has been the largest lender in general terms.  
On the other hand, from the data obtained we can conclude that the connection of 
the banks before the financial crisis was high. The strong connection between the countries' 
financial institutions led to an increase in cross-border lending. In principle this was 
beneficial, but the strong connection caused the imbalance in the United States to be passed 
on to the other countries. Thus, this work shows that financial connection led to financial 
contagion and it increased systemic risk. Second, the characteristics of the government were 
very important. Among them, corruption stands out. The results show that since the outbreak 
of the crisis, countries have placed greater value on corruption. Thus, cross-border lending 
was lower if corruption was high. Finally, we can also conclude that the unemployment rate 
was fundamental. 
Finally, we will mention the limitations of the work. Due to the lack of data, we have 
only been able to include three eastern countries. It would be useful to include other 
countries of this type in the study. On the other hand, in the future, it would be interesting to 
carry out an analysis similar to the one in the present work but differentiating between 
advanced and emerging countries.  
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APÉNDICE A 
1.1 SOURCE OF DATA 
When analyzing credit relationships it is useful to include indicators representative of 
the demand and supply of bank loans. Both GDP and unemployment are a sign of countries' 
economic activity. Therefore, they can be used to measure demand (Kapounek et al. 
(2017)). The GDP data have been obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). The database for the unemployment rate is the World Bank. 
On the other hand, the interest rate on government bonds and the interbank rate vary the 
supply of loans from countries. Besides, it should also be noted that both government bonds 
and the interbank rate determine long-term risk (Fontana et al. (2016) Iori et al. (2006)). Data 
on individual government bond yields are drawn from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Eurostat, investing.com & Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Country interbank rates 
are taken from FRED. Reserves and sovereign debt are other country-specific determinants 
that influence the possibility of default on their loans (Dimitrios et al. (2016)). Data on 
reserves have been obtained from the MFI. Data on government debt have been obtained 
from both the FRED and Eurostat. Finally, the level of corruption and regulatory quality is an 
indicator of the type of government that countries have. Data for both variables can be found 
in World Governance Indicators data (WGI). 
Table 6: Model variables and its sources 
LENDED Cross-border credits. 
Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). 
GDP Nominal GDP in millions of US dollars. 
United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). 
BON 
Financial, interest rates, government 
securities, government bonds, percent per 
annum. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Government bond yields, 10 years' maturity. Eurostat. 
Government bond yields, 10 years' maturity. investing.com 
Interest Rates, Government Securities, 
Treasury Bills for Turkey, Percent per 
Annum. 
Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED). 
INTER 3-Month or 90-day rates and yields: Federal Reserve Economic Data 
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Interbank Rates. (FRED). 
RES 
International liquidity, total reserves 
excluding gold, US dollars. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
GOV 
General government gross debt, percent of 
GDP. 
Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED). 
Government consolidated gross debt, 
percent of GDP. 
Eurostat. 
CORRU 
Control of Corruption. Estimate of 
governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance). 
World Governance Indicators data 
(WGI). 
REG 
Regulatory Quality. Estimate of governance 
(ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 
2.5 (strong) governance performance). 
World Governance Indicators data 
(WGI). 
UN 
Unemployment, total (% of total active 
population) (ILO modeled estimate). 
World Bank. 
 
1.2 DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Once the model has been estimated and the necessary data structure, a descriptive 
study of the explanatory variables is carried out. For this purpose the main statistics have 
been calculated. It can be seen in Table 7. It should be noted that the sample chosen 
includes a total of 922 observations. The variable that represents the foreign debt-to-GDP 
ratio has 272 unobservable observations. The variable representing the unemployment rate 
has 160 unobservable observations. The remaining independent variables have data for all 
countries and all years of interest. As indicated by the standard deviation, sovereign debt is 
the explanatory variable with the greatest variability in the entire sample. Therefore, external 
debt is the most dispersed variable to the average. According to the coefficient of variation, 
the variable that presents the greatest variability is the interbank rate. The less dispersed 
variables are regulatory quality according to the standard deviation and GDP according to 
the coefficient of variation. 
The results of the mean and median are similar. According to these statistics, the 
average GDP of all countries during the years studied is 14.089 million dollars. Its smallest 
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value in the entire sample is $12.009 million, and its largest value is $16.845 million. The 
interest rates on government bonds are 5.5% according to the average, and 3.5% according 
to the median. The difference between these values is very large, since the minimum rate is 
-0.0066%, and the maximum is 94.485%. The interbank rate is, on average, 2.96%. Under 
the median, the interbank rate is 1.22%. Again, the range of values is extensive. The 
smallest interbank rate is -0.329% and its maximum value is 69.96%. The average and 
median reserves are $11.199 and $11.002 respectively. Their minimum value is $9.016 and 
their maximum value is $14.045. Corruption has an average of 1.28 points and a median of 
1.37 points. Its minimum value is -0.52 and its maximum value are 2.47 points. The 
regulation quality is 1.37 points according to its average and 1.5 according to its median. Its 
minimum value is -0.26 points and its maximum value are 2.35 points. Finally, the average 
and the median of the unemployment rate are 7.9% and 7.4% respectively. The minimum 
value is 2.4% and the maximum value is 26%. 
Table 7: Main statistics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. C.V. Missing obs. 
ln_GDP 14.089 14.067 12.009 16.845 1.279 0.090 0 
BON 5.502 3.543 -0.066 94.485 11.294 2.052 0 
INTER 2.965 1.221 -0.329 69.960 7.697 2.595 272 
ln_RES 11.199 11.002 9.016 14.045 1.259 0.112 0 
GOV 78.005 64.291 23.663 236.34 49.809 0.638 0 
CORRU 1.289 1.377 -0.52 2.470 0.673 0.522 0 
REG 1.372 1.505 -0.26 2.354 0.538 0.392 0 
UN 7.969 7.494 2.400 26.094 4.187 0.525 160 
It is also important to consider how some variables influence others. Therefore, the 
correlation between them must be taken into account. For this purpose, the correlation 
matrix has been included. It shows in Table 8. The variables with the highest correlation are 
the regulatory quality of the borrowers and the control of corruption by the borrowers. In the 
case of borrowers, both variables also show a high correlation. Two other variables that are 
correlated are the rate of return on government bonds with the interbank rate of the 
borrowers' countries. The same is true on the borrower side. The remaining variables have a 
low correlation between them. 
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Table 8: Correlation matrix 
                                                
1.000 0.547 0.422 -0.291 -0.132            
 1.000 -0.052 -0.255 -0.040            
  1.000 -0.037 -0.255            
   1.000 -0.004        
    1.000        
 
                                                       
-0.234 -0.122 0.153 -0.061 0.377 0.081            
-0.247 -0.042 0.401 -0.024 0.476 0.021            
-0.045 -0.243 0.010 0.410 -0.019 0.455            
0.725 0.024 -0.221 -0.059 -0.155 -0.045        
0.024 0.725 -0.062 -0.220 -0.041 -0.157        
1.000 0.046 -0.200 -0.080 -0.171 -0.061          
 1.000 -0.083 -0.202 -0.057 -0.173          
  1.000 -0.031 0.464 0.020       
   
  
   1.000 0.012 0.488            
    1.000 -0.059        





                                             
0.294 0.183 0.332 0.175 -0.200 -0.052            
0.113 0.041 0.124 0.031 -0.168 0.045            
-0.017 0.101 -0.018 0.122 0.046 -0.180            
-0.480 0.064 -0.534 0.067 0.080 -0.059        
0.069 -0.485 0.071 -0.538 -0.059 0.079        
-0.422 0.051 -0.429 0.070 0.021 -0.090          
0.055 -0.420 0.072 -0.428 -0.091 0.020          
-0.105 0.008 -0.062 -0.003 -0.341 0.107            
-0.0006 -0.094 -0.013 -0.056 0.117 -0.342            
0.120 -0.017 0.162 -0.030 -0.214 0.082        
-0.017 0.095 -0.026 0.142 0.074 -0.208        
1.000 -0.117 0.922 -0.107 -0.447 0.056          
 1.000 -0.102 0.920 0.042 -0.447          
  1.000 -0.101 -0.370 0.037        
   1.000 0.025 -0.371        
    1.000 -0.042       
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